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The purpose of this paper is to review the recent
evolution of the NAVSUP (Naval Supply Systems Command)
budget justification process. The principal area of
interest will be the NAVSUP OMN (Operations and Maintenance,
Navy) budget. The budget process of every federal agency
has been forced to undergo extensive change since the
introduction of the planning, programming, and budgeting
system (PPBS) during the early 1960's. PPBS has broadened
the application of statistical, mathematical, and economic
techniques in the budgeting area. As a result, budget
justification based on intuition alone unaided by objective,
quantitative analysis has been unacceptable to Department of
Defense (DOD) , Congress , and the President for some time.
Indeed, as the pressures to cut budgets increase, even
better justification is needed.
Several of the goals of PPBS seem to be stimulating
recent NAVSUP efforts. One goal of PPBS is to measure the
output of a given program in terms of its objectives. For
example, the effectiveness of various stock points can only
be determined in relation to a particular set of objectives.
Concentrating stock dollars on high demand items may prove
highly effective when measured by net availability, the
percentage of demand requests for standard stock items
normally stocked at an activity receiving the request.

But if the objective is to serve the customer, a comparison
of stock points on the basis of such a measure of effective-
ness would be inappropriate and misleading. In this regard
we can contrast net availability with point of entry (POE)
availability (the percentage of initial entry demand requests
issued by the activity receiving the request). Looking at
the average FY 1973 IN cog availabilities, net availability
was 82%. Simultaneously, the POE availability for the same
group of items was 50$. The stock control officer at a
stock point might be happy with satisfying 8 out of 10
demands for stocks that should have been in the bins;
however, to a repair officer, the same 8 issues out of a
requirement for 16 line items (a 50$ POE availability) would
probably be unacceptable. Similarly, in evaluating the
entire supply corps effort at budget time, it is not suffi-
cient to speak of availabilities, but what the effort produces
in terms of increased fleet operating hours — how many hours
of equipment downtime awaiting parts are eliminated.
The objective of the Naval Material Command (NAVMAT) is
to maintain a particular equipment in operating condition
for a specified fraction of time [1]. This fraction of
time is defined as operational availability (Ao) and is







MTBF = Mean Time Between Failures
MSRT = Mean Supply Response Time
.
Operational Availability can be increased by increasing
MTBF or by decreasing MSRT. MTBF is affected by the design
and characteristics of an equipment's components and is the
responsibility of the hardware systems commands. On the
other hand, MSRT is affected by the availability of spare
parts and the performance of the distribution system.
These are, to a great extent, the direct responsibility of
the Navy Supply System. Accordingly, one objective of
NAVSUP is to achieve lower levels of supply response times
(MSRT) for failed equipments and weapon systems while
expending as little as possible for procuring and distri-
buting spare parts.
Another crucial aim of the PPBS concept is the analysis
of alternatives to find the means of reaching basic program
objectives for the least cost. The goal is to force federal
departments to consider particular programs not as ends in
*See Chapter IV for a more exact discussion of Ao
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themselves — to be perpetuated without challenge or question -
but as means to objectives, subject to the competition of
alternative and perhaps more effective or efficient programs.
PPBS seeks to suppress the practice of incremental budgeting
where the allocation process consists primarily of increasing
or decreasing existing programs without evaluating the
program's comparative contribution to the attainment of some
specified objective.
This aspect of PPBS has caused NAVMAT to look at NAVSUP
and NAVSEA for example not as two organizations to be
perpetuated just because they now exist, but instead, to
consider them as alternate competing programs whose outputs
affect the fleet's operational availability.
In response to this aspect of PPBS, an analytical
economic model is needed which will enable NAVSUP to success-
fully justify its requests for investment and expense budgets.
This model must, in quantitative terms, enable NAVSUP to
convince Navy, DOD, and Congressional budgeteers that
proposed expenditures offer the least-cost way of providing
various levels of benefits to the operating elements of the
Navy. The formulation of such a model must consider the
Supply System's interaction with maintenance by determining
the effect on operational availability of expenditures for
the Supply System to reduce MSRT versus equivalent expendi-
tures for the hardware commands to Increase MTBF or purchase
more end items. One approach might be to calculate the
increase in MTBF needed to achieve the same effect on Ao as
11

a proposed decrease in MSRT. The discussion of such a
trade-off can only be useful in justifying budget requests
if costs can be associated with proposed changes in MTBF or
MSRT. The costing methodology must be kept simple and
utilize currently available data.
The final goal of PPBS considered here is to establish these
analytic procedures as a systematic part of budget review.
PPBS seeks to subject policies and programs to analysis and
to integrate the decisions into the budgetary process. This
integration is encouraged by the fact that the allocation
of limited budgetary resources among competing claims can
best be made if fuller information and analysis of program
objectives, effectiveness, and costs are available. When
relatively narrow choices are involved — such as the alloca-
tion of operating dollars among various stock points —
analysis can contribute greatly to program decisions. But
even when broader questions are being considered — such as
allocation between maintenance and supply — analyses that
present the payoffs or consequences of each program can
assist the decision maker in weighing the alternatives.
These then are the aims of PPBS that seem to be stimulating
recent NAVSUP efforts: the evaluation of program output as
it relates to specified objectives, the analysis of competing
alternative programs, and the integration of policy and
program decisions with the budgetary process. The current
NAVSUP budget backup procedure was developed in the early
12

1960's because of the inadequacy of the method then in
practice. That method used as the only workload indicator
the number of line items issued. Projections were made by
adjusting this indicator by the planned percentage change
in Navy force levels. The current approach is a statistical
procedure which uses a broader base to relate more directly
NAVSUP's efforts to changes in force levels. It uses
historical data relating to several workload indicators —
not just the number of line items issued — and uses three
selected force level indicators corresponding to ships
,
aircraft, and personnel. Correlation analysis (see Appendix
A) is used to quantitatively describe the degree of relation-
ship between the force levels and NAVSUP workload.
Although the above procedure does apply some statistical
analysis in the projection of budgetary requirements, it does
not relate the output of NAVSUP activities to increased fleet
operational availability, nor does it analyze the tradeoffs
between maintenance and supply. In 1971 the Chief of Naval
Operations (CNO) directed that the Ships Supply Support
Study (S ) [19] be undertaken by NAVSUP to develop a set of
procedures that could be used annually by the Navy as part
of PPBS to justify and allocate budget dollars to supply
support. The study directive noted that there did not then
exist any way of describing the relationship between the
budget dollars allocated to supply support and supply support
effectiveness that is indicative of the readiness of fleet
13

units. The directive further noted that although several
"supply effectiveness" procedures intended to measure
specific aspects of internal supply system efficiency had
been developed, e.g., net and POE availabilities, measures
of that sort da not provide CNO with the criteria required
for the efficient allocation of budget dollars to supply
support.
h
The S study was completed in June 1973 and demonstrated
that many supply questions can be addressed in terms of the
effect on requisition response time and on resulting equipment
availability. One major criticism of the study was that it
never associated costs with perturbation of availability or
throughput time. The study attracted great interest in
h
reducing MSRT; within a month cf the final S M report, NAVSUP
directed the Fleet Material Support Office (FMSO) to establish
a separate department (the Supply System Performance Evalua-
tion Department — SSPED) to collect and monitor response-time
performance information and to devise and propose methods for
reducing response time. .In addition, billets for Operations
Analysis officers were established at all ICPs and four
supply centers. The Commander of NAVSUP, Rear Admiral Wallace
R. Dowd Jr. , began a series of articles in the December 1973
Supply Corps Newsletter encouraging readers to be aware of
fast response time as NAVSUP' s number one goal and to
contribute ideas on improving response time.
Still, a methodology was needed by NAVSUP to justify its
resources when competing at the budget table with alternate
1U

programs such as maintenance. In February of 197^, NAVSUP
requested FMSO to develop a model of the supply system that
takes into account the Interaction of supply, maintenance,
design and end-item production in sufficient breadth and
detail to permit statements of benefits and trade-off
possibilities. More specifically, FMSO was- requested to
develop a model to assist in the justification of the NAVSUP
OMN budget. A model was proposed by FMSO during May of 197^
and it is currently in the validation stage. A discussion
of that model is found in Chapter V.
15

II. THE NAVY SUPPLY SYSTEM
The Navy Supply System is administered by the Naval
Supply Systems Command (NAVSUP) , which is one of five
Systems Commands subordinate to the Naval Material Command
(NAVMAT). NAVSUP is directly responsible to the Chief of
Naval Operations (CNO) for providing the material support
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v^ J
Hardware Systems Commands
FIGURE 1. NAVMAT Organization
NAVSUP is responsible for supply management policies and
methods; administration of the Navy Supply System, publica-
tions and printing, the exchange and commissary program,
the Navy Stock Fund, the field procurement system, trans-
portation of Navy property, and material functions related
to materials handling equipment food service, and special
clothing. Of the four million items in the DOD Supply
16

System about 1.7 million are Navy-interest items. Almost
half of the Navy-interest items are managed and controlled
by NAVSUP through its two directly-managed Inventory Control
Points (ICPs), the Aviation Supply Office and the Ships
Parts Control Center. The hardware system commands exercise
inventory management over some 27,000 major items of material
such as missiles, aircraft engines , ordnance, shipboard
machinery, and electronics equipment. The remaining Navy-
interest items are managed by DSA or GSA but are controlled
for the Navy through the Fleet Material Support Office.
The prime characteristics of the operating forces: their
readiness, mobility, and endurance prescribe the form of
support which the Navy Supply System renders. The fleet is
virtually always mobilized — only the tempo varies.
Conceptually, Navy fleet supply support is based upon an
organic level of supply and two echelons of resupply. The
organic level provides the material specified in the Coor-
dinated Shipboard Allowance List. (COSAL) or Aviation
Consolidated Allowance List (AVCAL). The range and depth
of material on the allowance list is tailored to each specific
ship and is computed to provide balanced support for an
average endurance period of 2 1/2 months. The first echelon
of combat resupply consists of the ships of the Mobile
Logistic Support Forces (MLSF) which include tenders, repair-
ships, and replenishment ships. This force is augmented by
a very few overseas depots. This echelon of fleet support
17

backs up the allowance list material carried in the combatant
ships. The second level of resupply provides the materials
located predominantly at the tidewater supply centers in the
United States. These supply activities serve as the material
reservoir and act as pipelines between industry and DSA/GSA
supply systems and the fleet. Supply Centers issue Navy-,
DSA-, and GSA-managed material both to the MLSF ships and
directly to the operating fleets.
In addition to fleet support the supply centers provide
support to the activities of the Shore Establishment: the
air stations, ordnance stations, shipyards, training stations,
and small shore activities. The Inventory Control Points
determine the range and depth of items to be carried at
specific locations; position these inventories at the supply
centers; and determine, in collaboration with the hardware
systems commands and the customers served, the individual
support missions that the supply centers will carry out.
A. THE FORCES SUPPORTED BY NAVSUP
All funds required to operate the active forces of the
Navy, except military personnel costs, and the costs of
related support activities are appropriated by Congress under
the title of Operation and Maintenance, Navy (OMN). These
funds include amounts for pay of civilians, contract services
for maintenance of equipment and facilities, fuel, supplies,
and repair parts for weapons and equipment. Financial
requirements for these funds are influenced by a variety of
18

factors. The principal factors are force levels such as
•the number of aircraft squadrons, military strength and
deployment, rates of operational activity, number of instal-
lations, and quantity and complexity of major equipment
(aircraft, ships, missiles, etc.) in operation.
The programs covered under OMN appropriations which relate
to the active forces of the Navy are described below.
(1) Strategic forces. — The submarine missile fleet
consists of hi boats which deploy 656 Polaris and Poseidon
missiles. Estimates for 1975 reflect conversion of additional
submarines from Polaris to the more advanced Poseidon
ballistic missile.
(2) General purpose forces. —These forces consist of
the Navy's tactical air forces comprised of land, and carrier-
based antisubmarine and attack air wings and Navy combatant
and support ships. During 1975 the Navy will operate over
5400 aircraft including over 1300 fighter and attack planes.
Naval forces include 15 aircraft carriers, 118 submarines,
65 amphibious ships, antisubmarine forces, antiair forces,
and auxilliaries totalling 508 active fleet ships. These
operating forces are supported by 172 major Navy shore
activities including 15 naval stations and 3^ naval air
stations. Five nuclear submarines and one nuclear powered
guided missile frigate will be introduced into the fleet in
1975, bringing to one-third the proportion of warships that
are nuclear propelled. Seven other new ships will become
operational Including the first three of the 963 class
19

destroyer, a new type of amphibious assault ship (LHA) , and
two of a new class of patrol hydrofoils (PHM). The addition
of these modern vessels will permit further inactivation of
overage and obsolete vessels.
(3) Central supply and maintenance. — This program
includes funds for specialized supply and maintenance
activities. It provides resources for the determination of
inventory levels, procurement (excluding acquisition costs),
storage, distribution, depot-level maintenance and transpor-
tation of Navy materiel. These functions are Navy managed
and conducted at various locations worldwide at six supply
centers, two inventory control points, and 22 industrial
support facilities including shipyards and repair facilities.
(4) Other programs are training and medical, administra-
tion, intelligence and communications, and support of other
nations.
B. THE OMN BUDGET
Table I on the following page shows the Navy's recent
OMN budget as approved by the President for FY 1975. Table
II shows further detail for NAVSUP's portion of that budget.
These OMN appropriations as budgeted to Central Supply
and Maintenance have many possible allocations among the
Systems Commands. For any component of the Navy there exist
major logistical alternatives as to the use of these appropri-
ated funds. For illustrative purposes, these tradeoffs are
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*The FY 1974 total as of June 1974 was estimated at 414.4.
The FY 1975 NAVSUP total in the Congressional apportionment
request submitted in June 1974 was 525-9.
Some totals do not agree due to rounding.
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Source: FY 1975 Apportionment Request of June 1974 [4]
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C. MAJOR LOGISTICAL ALTERNATIVES
The general nature of the major logistical alternatives —
that Is, economic tradeoffs — is shown for support of carrier-







































First, there Is a carrier production function* [12]
analogous to others encountered by economists in industry.
As seen from the diagram below, the two primary outputs in










FIGURE 3. Carrier Aircraft Production Function
For a fixed number of assigned combat aircraft, the produc-
tion of AIC or flying hours is determined by the mix of
subsidiary inputs of (1) shipboard maintenance equipment —
including workspace, test equipment, etc; (2) shipboard
maintenance personnel — radar, engine airframe mechanics
including contract civilians, etc; and (3) shipboard spare
parts.
Second, there is an entire shipboard parts supply
function. An F4 series fighter may include some 128,000
listed parts (excluding the engine parts), but the shipboard
demand for most of these will be low or non-existent.




Consequently, the broad alternative sources of parts supply
on a carrier are (1) stock carried on board in the Aviation
Consolidated Allowance List (AVCAL), (2) repairs on board
in the Aircraft Intermediate Maintenance Department (AIMD),
or (3) requisitions from a resupply source (MLSP ship or
CONUS stock point) .
*
AVCAL
FIGURE 4. Inputs to Parts Production
Third, the requisitioning cycle of the carrier to a MLSF
ship or a CONUS stock point and back to carrier may be
shortened in various ways. The requisition can be passed by
some means of electric communication (naval message or even
AUTODIN**), rather than in some paper form (e.g., mail) that
is physically transported from the carrier to the resupply
activity. Requisitions can be processed more expeditiously,
perhaps through the use of new electronic data-processing
equipment. For example, requisitions presently being referred
^Actions such as on board fabrication of the part or
cannibalization are considered to be included in these
three sources.
**AUTODIN (Automated Digital Information Network) provides
high speed data transmission and switching capabilities
linking all major supply data processing installations.
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from a stock point to an ICP are sent via the AUTODIN
network, but the two computers are not directly linked.
Cards must be punched out by the stock point computer and
manually input to AUTODIN. At the ICP AUTODIN terminal,
cards are punched out and wait for up to an hour to be
manually input to the ICP computer. The delays for manual
processing are cumulative and could be eliminated entirely
by better, albeit more expensive, equipment. The location
of items at the warehouses and stock picking and packing can
be further automated to obtain quicker service, but at
higher cost. Transportation of the part to the carrier from
the shipping activity can be by such varied means as railroad
freight, air parcel post, railway express, truck, QUICKTRANS*,
or more rapidly, by direct airlift. The above are means of
reducing requisition response time. What is the economic
worth of a faster requisitioning cycle? What is the most
economical combination of communication, processing, and
transportation that yields any given requisition response
time? These are two worthwhile questions in themselves.
Lastly, for this analysis, there are procurement alterna-
tives for the supply managers at the ICP. They can buy spare
parts from the manufacturers and position them on the MLSF
ships or at a stock point. A small but costly fraction of
these parts are assemblies that can be economically repaired,
*QUICKTRANS is the Navy's nationwide civilian-contract
air transport system administered by NAVSUP to provide rapid
movement of high priority material.
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either at an aviation repair facility or by private
contractors. Or, if a part that has not been procured In
advance is needed, it can be "spot-procured" for the
individual requisition direct from the manufacturer who
might have it available in stock or might have to produce
it. The advantage of this latter procedure is that a final
provisioning buy of spares can be deferred until more is
known about actual demand usage and early design modifica-
tions have occurred.
The Interactions within the Navy Supply System are so
numerous and complex that it is difficult to view its
effectiveness objectively. Zealous managers sometimes
increase the efficiency of their own operation in ways that
may lessen the overall performance of the logistics system.
For example, transportation officers, who have some discretion
in selecting the mode of shipment of a part, may give too
much consideration to minimizing transportation costs and too
little to the impact on NORS* or on requisition response time.
This chapter has described the responsibilities of the
Navy Supply System as it pertains to the support of the
operating fleets and discussed some of the problems of choice
pertaining to Navy logistics. To help predict the conse-
quences of alternative policies and practices, we may use
models on paper, models in our heads, or models In the form
*NORS - (Not Operationally Ready Supply). This refers
to the operational status of an aircraft.
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of computer simulations. In any event, the alternatives
should be considered in terms of economic criterion. We
should look at these choices as problems of getting the
greatest capability from our limited resources.
28

III. JUSTIFICATION OF FY75 NAVSUP OMN BUDGET
A. BACKGROUND
.
The NAVSUP budget submission and justification process
begins over a year before the start of the fiscal year under
consideration. For instance, the FY 1975 submission to the
Navy Comptroller (NAVCOMPT) was dated 25 July 1973. This
basic budget request is prepared by adjusting the
POM - 75 basic budget for wage board increases, price
escalation costs, functional transfers, and all other
known changes. After a review of this budget submission
by NAVCOMPT, a revised budget is submitted to the Office
of the Secretary of Defense/Office of Manpower and Budget
(OSD/OMD) in late September or October. (The FY1975 OSD/OMB
submission for the NAVSUP OMN budget was dated 1 October 1973.)
In January preceding the beginning of the fiscal year, the
Congressional submission is prepared. This document helps
form the basis of the submission' of The Budget of the United
States Government which is submitted to the Congress by the
President. (The budget message of the President for FY1975
was presented to the Congress on 4 February 197*1.) Soon
after, the Congressional committees begin budget hearings,
and NAVSUP, like all other government agencies, is called
upon to justify its requests for funds. By June preceding
the fiscal year the modified budget is delivered to the
Congress in the apportionment submission. (The FY1975
apportionment submission was dated 1 June 19 7^ - ) The
29

objective of the entire budget review process is to develop
defensible, solid budget estimates for submission to OSD and
Congress.
B.. NAVSUP OMN BUDGET PROGRAM ELEMENTS
Throughout the budget-reviewing process, NAVSUP partitions
its requests for OMN funds into the seven program elements:
Supply Depots/Operations, Inventory Control Points, Procure-
ment Operations, Base Communications, Commissary Stores,
Command, and Second Destination Transportation. Funds for
each program element are justified by relating requirements
to a forecast obtained by using some budget projection
technique. The procedure currently used by NAVSUP for each
program element is discussed below.
1. Supply Depots/Operations
Funds requested under this program element are for
the operation of supply centers and depots located in the
United States under the responsibility of NAVSUP. These
supply outlets are engaged in the receipt, storage, and
distribution of military supply items. They form the core
of the Navy resupply network required to sustain the operating
forces and the supporting shore establishment. Workload at
stockpoints is forecast on the basis of a significant
correlation* which exists between selected supply workload
*See Appendix A for a discussion of how the existence of
this correlation was demonstrated.
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at supply outlets and the force levels of the operating
fleets (Ships, Aircraft, and Military Personnel).
Three measures corresponding to the forces NAVSUP
supports are developed from force level data. The number
of COSAL items is used to measure the force level of ships
in the active fleet; the number of aircraft support items
is used to measure the force level of the number of
programmed operating aircraft in the fleet; and the number
of active Navy military personnel is used as a direct
measure. NAVSUP has found that using the number of support
items for ships and aircraft is more representative of the
forces supported than the use of the total number of ships
and aircraft in the fleet. The total number of ships could
remain the same from one fiscal year to the next; however,
due to a change in the types of ships, the total number of
ships' support items (our force level indicator) could vary.
For instance, from one fiscal year to the next the Navy
might retire two minesweepers (4000 support items each) and
two diesel-powered submarines (8000); at the same time,
three nuclear frigates (30,000) and one nuclear ballistic
submarine (40,000) might be commissioned. Although the
number of active ships remains constant, the number of
support items (and hence NAVSUP* s workload) increases by
106,000 items. As more complex and newer ships or aircraft,
which require more support, enter the fleet to replace current
forces, NAVSUP workload is projected using support items as
31

a representative measure of force level. In the case of
the personnel force level, equal weights are assigned since
support per person is considered comparable on the average.
In order to obtain an indication of the change in
the forces which NAVSUP supports from one fiscal year to
the next, an index for each force level indicator is calcu-
lated by dividing the force level indicator of the outyear by
the one for the base year. Table III shows the indices for
FY 1975 as 0.955 for ships, 0.990 for aircraft, and 0.978
for military personnel as the percentage changes from the
base year of FY 1974.
Three measures selected to reflect NAVSUP' s supply
operations workload are (1) line items received and issued;
(2) measurement tons received and issued; and (3) measurement
tons in store. Estimates of the first two are projected
using the force level indices discussed above. The third,
being relatively insensitive to changes in force levels,
is adjusted for planned changes only. Weighting factors are
developed to connect base year workload totals to proportional
splits between ships, aircraft, and personnel. This is done
by using NAVSUP 1144 data* (or NAVSUP PUB 295) and assigning
each material cognizance code and its attendant issues and
receipts to either ships, aircraft, or personnel or a
*NAVSUP Form 1144, Supply Distribution and Inventory
Control Operations Report, is submitted monthly by major






Summary of Force Level Indices Utilized in
Computing FY 1975 Apportionment Request
Workload Requirements
SHIPS
Average Active fleet ships













Average Operating Aircraft 5,692












percentage split between any/all of these categories.
Table IV shows the weighting factors for Line Items In and
Out as 52$ for ships, 19JS for aircraft, and 29% for personnel.
These weights are then applied to the total workload of
13,138,000 issues and receipts to obtain 6,832/2,496/3810
as the proportional splits (in thousands). The respective
force level indices of 0.955/0.990/0.978 are then applied
to obtain the projected proportional splits for ship/aircraft/
personnel workloads of 6525/2471/3726. These are then added
to obtain the projected number of Line Items In and Out for
FY 1975 of 12,722,000. Similarly, the projected number of
measurement Tons In and Out was calculated to be 6,751,000.
Measurement Tons in Store is projected to remain constant
at 1,898,000. Table V shows the actual force level indicators
and the corresponding workloads for the last four fiscal years.
To obtain projected budgetary requirements, the
relative changes in workload from base year totals are first
converted to percentage variations. The percentage workload
change between the current year and succeeding year is then
applied to the current level of funding to determine
budgetary requirements for each applicable area. These
estimates are then increased for pay raises, increased
health benefits, price escalation, known projects, or other
special management programs and decreased for reduced
funding of supply workload, functional transfers, or other




Derivation . of FY 1975 Supply Operations
Workload Requirements (in thousands)
Line Items In and Out (000)
Ships 52$ =
Aircraft 19S6 =






6,832 x 0.955 = 6,525
2,496 x 0.990 = 2,471
3,810 x 0.978 = + 3,726
Projected workload: 12 ,722
M/Tons In and Out (000)
Ships 69£ = 4,838
Aircraft 9% = 630
Military Personnel 22$ = 1,542
7,010
x 0.955 = 4,619









Force Level Indicators vs. Ships Workload
(figures in thousands)
FY 1971 FY 1972 FY 1973 FY 1974
SHIPS
FL 9,891 7,923 7,263 6,914
LI 8,710 8,343 7,750 6,832
M/T 5,259 5,017 4,729 4,838
AIRCRAFT
FL 461,800 455,503 444,835 447,860
LI
. 2,995 3,049 2,831 2,496





658 613 576 556
4,992 4,653 4,322 3,810
1,508 1,599 1,508 1,542
FL = force level
LI = line items in and out
M/T = measurement tons in and out (1 M/T = 40 cubic feet)
Source: yearly apportionment submission documents
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cost of facilities management is then added to obtain a
final estimate for the Supply Depots/Operations program
element. Table VI shows the figures for FY 1975.
2 . Inventory Control Points
Funds requested under this program element are for
the operation of ICPs under the responsibility of NAVSUP.
The following are major considerations determining workload
and funding requirements at the ICPs.
(a) The change in the annual rate of supply support
items related to new ships and aircraft initially introduced
into the fleet. Workload under this category consists of
such efforts as provisioning, identification, and procure-
ment of initial spares. The predominant workload factor
and costs in this operation involve effort related to
provisioning actions.
(b) The total ships and aircraft supply items
required for continuing support to Navy force levels of
ships and aircraft in the operating fleet. Workload under
this category consists of such non-automated functions as
reviewing stock actions, repositioning of material within
the system, procurement of parts for immediate fleet use or
system stock replenishment. The predominant workload factor
and costs in this operation concern effort related to stock
actions.
(c) Costs of program support for weapon systems and
other logistic programs to maintain fleet readiness and to




Supply Depots/Operations FY 1975 Budget
FUNDED WORKLOAD; Stock point workload that can be
accomplished within funding availability
approved as of June 1974 (in thousands)
FY 197^ FY 1975
Workload FUNDS($) V/orkload FUNDS($)
Line Items In and Out 13,015 43,032 12,631 43,494
M/Tons In and Out 6,810 47,783 6,650 51,513
M/Tons In Store 1,898 8,356 1,898 9,010
SUBTOTAL: 99,171 104,017
Facilities Management 18,582 22,862
STOCKPOINT TOTAL: 117,753 ±^D,0/9
UNFUNDED WORKLOAD:
Line Items In and Out














Two measures selected to reflect NAVSUP's ICP
workload are (l) stock actions and (2) provisioning items
reviewed. The count of stock actions by ICP is reported
monthly and is already broken out by ships (SPCC*) and
aircraft (ASO*). The base year count of provisioning items
reviewed is calculated from the number of items actually
selected to be introduced as spares during that year. A
historical percentage (one for each ICP) is obtained from
an annually-updated five-year average of items reviewed to
items selected. This percentage is then applied to the
report of the number of items selected to obtain an estimate
of provisioning items which were reviewed during the base
year.
The same force level indicators (less the count of
active military personnel) as used to reflect the forces
supported by NAVSUP stock points are used to reflect the
forces supported by NAVSUP ICPs when forecasting the number
of continuing support actions; however, new indices are
prepared when forecasting the number of provisioning actions.
This is because such workload is not due to the current number
of ships and aircraft support items, but is due to the
construction/conversion of new ships and the purchase of new
aircraft. For example, when forecasting the number of stock
actions the two indices as shown in Table III of 0.955 for
*SPCC stands for Ships Parts Control Center. ASO stands




ships and 0.990 for aircraft are used to show the percentage
relationship of FY 1975 to base year 1974. The index for
personnel is not utilized since this program element
principally funds SPCC and ASO which support ships and
aircraft, respectively , but are involved in little, if any,
support of personnel. An index of 1.0 is used to relate
both ship and aircraft provisioning workload since there was
little change between FY 197^ and FY 1975 in the number of
new aircraft support items and new ship construction/
conversion support items. Table VII shows the derivation of
FY 1975 ICP workload requirements. For illustration of the
provisioning support force level indices, Table VIII shows
actual data from the FY 1973 OSD/OMB budget submission.
Table IX chows the FY 1975 budget figures obtained by
comparing workload and funds for the base year to projected
workload to obtain a budgetary requirement. Adjustments are
made to this figure to account for known factors like pay
raises. To this figure are added projected totals for
other Navy Management Activities, Logistic Support Programs,
and funds for Facilities Management.
3. Procurement Operations
Funds requested under this program element are for
supporting services'/activities and for NAVSUP's share of
Naval shipyard supply department costs. Funds requested
provide for supporting services such as publication and














SHIPS 1,760 X 0.955 1,681
AIRCRAFT 1,806 X 0.990 = + 1,788
Projected Workload: 3,469
Provisioning Items 790
SHIPS 625 x 1.0 625
AIRCRAFT 165 x 1.0 + 165




Illustration of FY 1973 OSD/OMB - Submission ICP
Provisioning Workload Force Level Indices
FY 1971 FY 1972 FY 1973















Total New Ship Construction/














Inventory Control Points FY 1975 Budget
FUNDED WORKLOAD: ICP Workload that can be accomplished
within funding availability approved
as of June 1974 (in thousands)
:
FY 1974 FY 1975
Workload Funds Workload Funds
(000) ($000) (000) ($000)
1. Navy Item Management Activities
a. Continuing Support-stock actions 3,533 28,799 3,339 28,503
b. Initial Support-provisioning actions 790 17,020 790 17,136
2. Other Navy Management Activities
3. Logistic Support Programs
4. Facilities Management






Continuing Support-stock actions 33 179 130 770
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They also provide for costs of supporting activities such
as the Navy Procurement Offices and the Navy Material
Transportation Office. In addition, this program element
includes funds to support Non-Navy Industrial Fund effort
at Naval shipyards. Funds requested are calculated on the
basis of staffing needs and other cost considerations
incident to performing work in each specific area.
H . Base Communications
Funds requested under this program element are for
leased communications costs at field activities/headquarters
of NAVSUP. Requirements are determined on the basis of
continuing reviews of workload demands for communications
facilities and estimated utilization.
5. Base Operations (Commissaries )
.
Funds requested under this program element are for
civilian staffing at Navy commissary stores and for support
received from the Navy Resale System Office (NRSO), Brooklyn,
New York, for Navy exchanges and. ships' stores. Requirements
under this program are determined on the basis of projected
sales volumes at existing commissary stores and the need
to establish new stores where there are sufficient authorized
patrons but no commissary facilities available. The funds
requested are calculated on the basis of the civilian staffing
needed to handle projected sales workload and costs associ-





The funds requested under this program element are
to cover staffing requirements and related support costs
at NAVSUP headquarters. Requirements are related to the
minimum staffing necessary to provide central control and
direction and other support to field activities. Funding
requirements are based on the headquarter ' s staffing level
and associated support costs.
7. Second Destination Transportation
The funds requested under this program element are
for second destination transportation costs and terminal
operations. These funds provide for the movement of supplies,
material, and overseas military mail in support of the
operating forces. Requirements are determined on the basis
of the force levels to be supported, giving consideration
to tonnage/dollar expenditure trends being experienced as
adjusted for known change factors that would affect
transportation/terminal workload and costs.
^5

IV. RESPONSE TIME AS A MEASURE OF OUTPUT
As discussed in the introduction, NAVSUP is responding
to the goal of PPBS that requires the analysis of the output
of the Supply System in terms of its objectives. The number
one objective of the Navy Supply System is stated below [21]
General Objective #1
NAVSUP will provide optimum support in appropriate
categories of supplies and services, responsive
to the requirements of the Navy including project
managers, other supported services and agencies,
and allied nations under the International Logistics
Programs. For general material, optimum support is
that which maximizes requisitions satisfied within
the time frame required by the requisitioner. For
technical material, optimum support is that which
minimizes downtime of weapons systems due to lack
of repair parts and components.
This chapter is concerned with the development of an appro-
priate measure of Supply System output in terms of this
objective as applied to technical material (repair parts or
components of a weapon system) . Notice that the above
General Objective, in its last sentence, suggests a criterion
for measuring technical material support effectiveness.
This definition of "optimum support" can be interpreted as
that which maximizes operational availability (the fraction
of time a given equipment or weapons system is operational)
by minimizing supply response time (the time required to
requisition and assemble all the parts required to complete
a corrective maintenance action). Consequently, a discussion
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of the manner and magnitude of the relationship between
supply response time and operational availability form the
bulk of this chapter.
Prom an engineering viewpoint, availability historically
has been thought of as mean time between failures (MTBP)
divided by the mean time between failures (MTBF) plus the






This is an idealistic view of the world assuming that all
needed repair parts are available when needed. In the real
world, delays are almost always incurred due to nonavaila-
bility of needed parts. To obtain operational availability
from this equation, one must add mean logistic delay time
(MLDT) to the denominator:
MTBF
A = MTBF + MTTR + MLDT
E Operational Availability
where MLDT can be thought of as the sum of mean administrative
delay time (MADT) and mean supply response time (MSRT)
.




o MTBF + MTTR + MADT + MSRT
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Investigations of actual data indicate that MSRT appears to
average 30 to 40 times MADT and MTTR combined [1], and that
MSRT is, in the eyes of NAVSUP, the driving factor in the
equation for operational availability. In addition, the
time to actually repair the equipment (MTTR — typically a
few hours) is insignificant when compared with the time to
assemble the parts (MSRT — typically greater than 100 hours)
Consequently, for computational purposes, operational





where R = MTBF (Reliability)
S = MTTR + MADT + MSRT
= MSRT (Supportability)
To illustrate the importance of considering MSRT when
discussing availability of an equipment, we can contrast
A. with A in an actual case where MTBF = 400 hours;
MTTR + MADT = 6 hours: and MSRT = 240 hours.





Operational Availability (Ao) = hnn + 24o
= °-625
As these data point out, supply response time Is a major
factor in the availability equation.
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The use of 240 hours (10 days) as an example of MSRT
is not without justification. Remember, MSRT is the time
to acquire all parts needed for a maintenance action; that
is, MSRT = max
J
murn {MRRT* of ith part} . Also, this 10 days
average delay may be experienced even with 90 percent of the
maintenance actions requiring parts being satisfied with
onboard COSAL parts. For illustrating the computations
involved, assume a maintenance action requiring only one
part so that MSRT equals the MRRT of that item. Let the
COSAL effectiveness for that item be 90 percent and the
time required to resupply the part be 100 days. The calcula-
tion of MSRT would then be
MSRT = MRRT = 0.90 xO days + 0.10 x 100 days = 10 rlays
(240 hours) .
In the above example, resupply is assumed to take an average
of 100 days; in the case of extreme situations such as a
ship's casualty, the supply system delay time may be only
15-20 days on the average. Assuming a COSAL effectiveness
of 90$ and a resupply time of 20 days, MSRT in these
mission-critical situations would be more on the order of
2 days:
MSRT = 0.90x0 days + 0.10x20 days = 2 days
*MRRT (Mean Requisition Response Time) is the average
length of time to satisfy a given requisition.
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Note that if COSAL effectiveness drops from 90 to
MSRT doubles to k days!
MSRT = 0.80x0 days + 0.20x20 days = *l days
To get an insight into the relationship between Ao,
MTBF, and MSRT we can use our simplified relationship
Ao = h x c to examine the marginal benefits (in terms of
increased Ao) of improved reliability (R) or improved
support (S). The partial derivative of Ao for small decrease
in S is
AAo „ R
AS (R + S) 2
and Figure 5 shows the results for fixed values of R - 50,200,
and ^00 hours. These results tell us that, at least in terms
of current performance, we will produce more operational
availability (Ao) if we spend our resources reducing MSRT on
equipments with relatively high reliability values rather
than if we spend those same resources on equipments with
low reliability. (If MSRT is already low, the opposite is
true)
.
We now compute and plot "production functions"* with
inputs R and S for various fixed operational availability
*A production function is a technical relationship telling
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MSRT (S)
FIGURE 5. Marginal Changes in Ao as a Function of MSRT
values. Figure 6 presents the results. Notice the relative
"payoff" per increment of increase in R as compared to an
incremental decrease in S. The dotted lines indicate
increases in Ao of 20% from 0.20 to 0.24, 0.50 to 0.60,
and 0.70 to 0.84. Examine the ratio of AR to AS for these
20% increases in Ao. At Ao = 0.70 this requires 32 units
of R to produce what alternatively can be produced using
only 6 units decrease in S.
There is a different story for Ao = 0.20 (MSRT four
times larger than MTBF, say R = 50 and S = 200 . . . see


















FIGURE 6. Contours of Operational Availability (Ao)
The contour lines of Ao do not extend to
the origin because reduction of MSRT to
values close to zero hours is not a
realistic alternative to increasing MTBF.
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it takes only 4 units increase in R as compared to 12 units
decrease in S. When R and S are equal (Ao = 0.50), we again
have to decrease S less than the increase in R for the same
20$ increment in Ao. With the development of cost information
such as the cost of higher reliability or the cost of faster
requisitioning, this approach could help us improve upon our
decisions as to the allocation of scarce resources during
design, development, and provisioning of weapons systems.
These tradeoffs between MTBF and MSRT are important consid-
erations when you have options with respect to investment in
reliability or supportability ; however, for most operating
equipment there are severe limits on our ability to improve
MTBF. It therefore, becomes important to know how and to
what extent improvements in MSRT can be accomplished.
The Ships Supply Support Study (S ) investigated various
equipments empirically to provide some insights into the
effect of MTBF and MSRT on Ao. To illustrate the current
lack of appropriate information, out of the original 275
equipments chosen for investigation, only 38 had the
necessary data in the 3-M data files to facilitate the
parametric analysis. Among the data required were equipment
identification codes (EIC) from which MTBF and MTTR are
obtained and the EIC code cross reference to ship so that
ship steaming hours can be determined.
A graph of Ao versus MSRT is useful for pointing out the
impact on availability of reductions in MSRT. Such a graph
can identify an equipment whose reliability is either so good
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or so bad as to rule out improvement of MSRT as a means to
improve Ao significantly. There might be two reasons for
the inability of MSRT to significantly improve Ao : (1) the
equipment hardly ever fails (as reflected by a very large
MTBP) or (2) it hardly ever works (as reflected by a very
low MTBF). In either case a significant Improvement in Ao
by improving supply alone is hopeless — in the first case
(high MTBP), happily unnecessary, and in the second case
(low MTBF), unhappily true. For this reason, equipments can
be segregated into three groups with respect to MSRT:
(1) those equipments for which Ao can be significantly
improved by effecting lower MSRT (typified by Figure 7);
(2) those equipments whose reliability is so high as to
insure very high Ao regardless of MSRT (see Figure 8); and
(3) those equipments with such a low MTBF (high frequency
of failure) that even substantial reduction in supply response
times have little effect on Ao (illustrated by the equipment
in Figure 9). Of the 38 equipments analyzed by S , the
distribution over the three groups was about equal.
MSRT is the only factor of Ao that NAVSUP can influence
to any extent, since MTBF and MTTR are directly influenced
by the Hardware Systems Commands and the fleet commanders.
Consequently, NAVSUP considers MSRT as its most important
output where less is better than more. MSRT is itself a
product with various inputs, and can, like Ao , be described
by a function which is characteristic of the structure and
54
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FIGURE 7. Operational Availability of AN/WRT2
Transmitting Set, Radio
(MTBF = 2126 Hrs.; MTTR =-10.0 Hrs.)
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FIGURE 8. Operational Availability of AN/WRC1
Transceiver, Radio
(MTBP = 10478 Hr.s., MTTR = 6.3 Hrs.)
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FIGURE 9. Operational Availability of AN/ULQ 6A
Repeater, Countermeasures , ECM, Pulse





behavior of the Supply System. Imagine a supply system
with n echelons, the first being the storeroom of the ship
and the n being the manufacturer of the part. If the
failed part can be supplied from the ship's storeroom, it
is; otherwise, a requisition is forwarded to the next echelon,
which supplies the item if it can. Otherwise, the requsition
is sent through successive echelons until it is supplied or
manufactured. The MSRT observed by the mechanic on the ship
is just the sum of the response times of each echelon
multiplied by the fraction of total requirements the echelons




















= I a.T. n (1-a.)
j=l J J i=l
where a. e the probability that the j echelon will
^ satisfy an end-use requisition not satisfied
by a lower echelon;
T. e the time elapsing from mechanic's stated need
^ for the material until the mechanic receives
material from the j th echelon.
To get an idea of what this model says, we can assume
a ^-echelon supply system comprised of ship's storeroom,
a MLSF ship, an ICP, and finally .the manufacturer of the
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part. This model of the Supply System would entail eight









*T (1 - a^ (1 - a
2
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)(l - a-) (see Figure 10)
We are interested in discovering which of the eight variables
we could modify so as to obtain maximum reduction in MSRT.
At present, cost data are not readily available, so we will
assume equality of costs. In an effort to reduce the large
number of combinations of variables which might be investi-
gated, realistic values have been assigned to all but two
variables for each examination of the supply MSRT function.
T
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First, look at the MSRT function for input variables
Tp and T~ holding the other variables fixed at a, = 0.80,
a
2
= 0.70, a, = 0.75, a^ = 1.0 (material is always ultimately
available from the manufacturer), T, = (if part available
on the ship, time to issue part is .negligible), and T^ = 180
days (for the manufacturer to supply the part it takes an
average of six months). For these values, S = 0.14
S = 0.14T
2




= (22. 2S - 60) - 3.1T2
As seen in Figure 11, the contours of this MSRT function
with Tp and T^ as inputs are straight lines with slope -3.1.
This says that a unit decrease in T
?
is worth approximately
3.1 units decrease in T~. Thus we see that S can be reduced
from ten to eight days by either reducing Tp by 14 days
or To by 4 3 days. Observe the dramatic reduction in Tp or
T_ that is necessary to reduce S to five days.
When the values of a-, and a-^ are increased, holding T~
at 60 days and raising supply effectiveness at the third
echelon (aO from 0.75 to O.85 allows the average response
time Tp to go from just under 33 days to 39 days while
maintaining at 10-day MSRT. However, if we increase a-, from
0.80 to 0.85 we could let Tp increase from 33 to 56 days and
still maintain the 10-day MSRT.
Figure 12 indicates the effect of changing the input
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FIGURE 12. Contours of MSRT(S)
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that Is required to decrease MSRT from ten to five days and
to get MSRT down to two days requires an increase of a„
of 100 percent.
Figure 13 shows the results of treating a~ and Tp as
the input factors. When a is in the area of 0.70, which
is close to real life, one can reduce MSRT from over 17 days
to close to 11 days by either reducing T~ from approximately
110 days to about 30 days or by increasing a2 from 0.70 to
almost 100?
.
This chapter has stressed that logistic delay time and
supply response time in particular is of major importance
in achieving desired levels of operational availability.
Tradeoffs between supply and maintenance (MSRT and MTBF)
should be considered when allocating resources within NAVMAT,
and tradeoffs between stock and manpower (A. and T.) should









V. A PROPOSED NAVSUP OMN BUDGET JUSTIFICATION MODEL
There are many ways to allocate the total funds for
support available to the Systems Commands within the Naval
Material Command. Analyses which do not consider the alter-
native allocation of funds within NAVMAT are "suboptimizations"
since their impact on other parts of the system has generally
not been considered. In February of 197*1, NAVSUP requested
that FMSO develop a model of the Supply System that takes
into account the interaction of supply, maintenance, design,
and end-item production in sufficient breadth and detail to
permit statements of benefits and tradeoff possibilities.
The specific aim was the development of a model which would
assist NAVSUP in justifying its OMN budget.
Gates [7] of the Supply System Performance Evaluation
Department used marginal analysis to develop a mathematical
model of the Navy Supply System.
Briefly, the approach was to describe the system
in terms of production and cost fucntions, collapse
these functions into their marginal values, equate
the ratios of marginal physical products and marginal
costs and then solve for the variable of interest...
There are two implied assumptions in the model and
one explicit assumption. The implied assumptions are:
(a) the system is operating in an economically efficient
manner, and (b) input prices are determined in a purely
competitive market. The explicit assumption is that
Mean Supply Response Time is a function of only manpower
and stock that are available in the supply system. and




Marginal Improvements in Supply System Response Time
for a particular weapon system are assumed to be proportional,
by a factor of a and 3, to respective increases in manpower
and months of stock for that weapon system.
The assumption about response time, stated mathematically
is
R = y exp{-aM - 3S }
where: R = Mean Supply Response Time (MSRT)
M = Supply System Man Months
S = Months of Stock
a,3,y = Regression Coefficients.
This formulation of MSRT differs from that discussed in
Chapter IV of this paper. The earlier discussion of MSRT
treated it from a structural viewpoint, i.e., response time
is actually the sum of throughput times at various echelons
weighted by the probability that the requisition will reach
each echelon. The formulation above treats MSRT as being
correlated with the manpower and stock levels of the entire
supply system. A method to be used to determine this
correlation in such an exponential relationship was proposed
by Gates [8]. The above function has the following proper-
ties: (a) response time monotonically decreases as manpower
and stock levels increase; (b) response time approaches zero
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as manpower and stock levels Increase without bound and
(c) when M and S are zero then R = y, I.e., there is a value
for response time even if there is no supply system.





9 exp{-IL})NaBy] - ln[k, (Be, + acn) ] - SS
M = 5 2
a i '
where
M = Supply System Man-months
P = Force Level Unit (FLU) (e.g., aircraft, ship, etc.)
Cy = Cost of a FLU
c 2
= Cost of operating a FLU per month
c
3
= Cost of a Man-month ($13.8Vhr x 172 hrs = $2,380)
Cj, = Value of Monthly Stock Issues
I = Nominal Interest Rate
Ao = Probability a FLU is operational
L = Life Expectancy of a FLU (months)
k-, = MTBF, Mean Time Between Failures (months)
S = Number of Months of Stock in Supply System
(On hand dollar value divided by cj
N = Number of Operational FLUs = (F)(Ao)
a,3,y = Regression Coefficients for Supply System Response Time
Appendix B gives the complete mathematical development of the
above model as taken from Ref. 7.
For the model to be dimensionally correct, each additive
term must have the same dimensions as M, i.e., man-months.
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The simplest additive term (3 )S, should for example
represent man-months. Prom the definition of the variables
as given in Ref. 7, the dimensions assigned to each variable
are not obvious. It appears that M represents optimal man-
months for a weapon system comprised of many FLUs , but k-.
seems to represent MTBF of an FLU. Once the level of
aggregation is determined, weapon system or FLU, there exists
a measurement problem in acquiring the data as with any model.
The model gives the optimal level of supply system man-
months to support a particular weapon system, given a set of
input values for that weapon system. Total man-months for
supply support of the Navy would then have to be estimated
from the sum of optimal values for each individual weapon
system. The total would be adjusted downward to account for
overlapping areas among weapon systems; the total would be
adjusted upward to account for supply system workload such
as logistic support programs not directly related to U. S.
Navy weapon systems. It is not clear whether this procedure
would result in total manpower requirements above or below
the sum of optimal levels for each weapon system. Total
NAVSUP manpower requirements in dollars for the OMN budget
could then be obtained by multiplying the total man-months
required by the cost of a man-month.
To make a preliminary test of their model, FMSO needed
base values for the input variables. They obtained several
of the input values from figures used by the Center for
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Naval Analyses (CNA) [2]. Those figures were elements In
the costs used In estimating the production function
parameters for a hypothetical aircraft; specific costs,
which are classified, are given In an unpublished manuscript
referred to In Ref. 2. Other values (c^j S, a, g, y) were
specified by FMSO as being reasonable estimates.























Cost of a Man-month
($13.8Vhr x 172 hrs . )
Value of Monthly Issues
Nominal Interest Rate
Service Life
MTBF (100 hrs * 720 hrs. /mo.)
Stock Level
Number of Operating Aircraft
Representative Regression Coefficients
The results of running the model and incrementing N, S, K,














- 25£ 529.0 573.1 587.0 740.0 547.1
+ 25$ 579.8 5^2.0 535.7 447.9 563.0
Base value = 558.0 man-months
TABLE X.
Optimal Level of Supply System Man-Months (M)
for Hypothetical Aircraft for Various Levels
of Input Values.
[Source: Reference 7, Table, p. 2.
Each figure divied by c^ = $2,380.]
FMSO interpreted the values in the table as showing that
the supply system manpower requirement for this weapon system
increases as the number of operating aircraft comprising the
weapon system increases; it decreases as the number of months
of stock increases or as the time between failures increases.
It is sensitive to regression coefficient a but not 3. FMSO
recommended to NAVSUP that a project be approved to develop
actual weapon system parameters to use in validating the
model.
Gates [8] suggests a logarithmic transformation of the
expression for R to obtain
In R = In y - otM - 6S.
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The regression coefficients a, 3, and y could then be
estimated using a multiple regression procedure. For input
data a time series of response time, man-months expended,




NAVSUP cannot obtain OMN funds on the basis of need
alone; national defense resources are becoming more severely
constrained each year. This factor, along with the pressures
to conform to PPBS practices, have started a trend within
NAVSUP to justify budget requests as being least-cost
allocations to achieve a given level of output.
NAVSUP faces a political dilemma when specifying its
objective. It is forced to "advertise" two conflicting
objectives. The fleet is told that the goal is minimizing
MSRT; the budgeteers and Congress are told that the goal is
achieving a set level of MSRT at least cost. In either
case, NAVSUP has chosen MSRT as the most relevant measure of
its output effectiveness. It has assigned a group of
professionals within FMSO (SSPED) the difficult task of
developing techniques of measuring MSRT and estimating the
input costs associated with achieving lower levels of MSRT
for a given weapon system. As a continuation of this effort,
supply operation activities' effectiveness should be measured
as to their impact on system output (MSRT) , rather than on
their net or POE effectiveness or other parochial measures
of effectiveness alone.
The current NAVSUP budget justification procedure, which
is based on workload measurement, is not adequate since it
provides no means of evaluating tradeoffs between NAVSUP
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output and hardware system commands' output. The lack of
an analytical model encompassing both supply and maintenance
prevents statements about "optimal" allocations. In addition,
the current procedure is self-serving since workload is based
on allowance lists which are developed to a large extent by
NAVSUP activities. Presently, management programs are
funded by adjusting priced-out workload upward; they should
be funded by proposed savings in the workload area.
Improvement programs should increase productivity which
should be reflected in the workload model.
The Gates model is a good start towards the application
of economic analysis to resource allocation decisions
effecting support costs (OMN) within NAVMAT. There do seem
to be problems with dimensionality within the model between
individual force level units and weapon system level measure-
ments. The procedure for aggregating manpower requirements
by weapon system to total supply system manpower requirements
must be carefully considered. Some consideration must be
made for including non-weapon system manpower requirements
such as the support of other support organizations like
medical. Finally, the usefulness of the model is contingent
upon the development of weapon system parameters and further
validation with actual data.
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VII. SUGGESTED AREAS OF RESEARCH
During the investigative stages of this thesis, the
following ideas for possible research were proposed by
Mr. J. A. Gates of the Fleet Material Support Office (FMSO).
A processing model would assist in the use of MSRT as a
management tool; the combination of data to increase sample
sizes would allow the use of more analytic techniques; and
demand forecasting and stocking criteria improvements are
applicable to the analysis of resource allocations as well
as to other problems.
A. PROCESSING MODEL
There are four time segments that are being investigated
in response time problems. They are:
Requisition Submission Time
Availability Determination Time
Storage Site Processing Time
Transportation Time
Information on arrival rates of requisitions and the service
times for each segment are available. The development of a
simple queuing model using Erlang distributions for service
times (or other distributions) would assist FMSO in evaluating
proposed stock point or ICP management changes.
B. DATA COMBINATION
A frequent difficulty encountered in the analysis of
data is the lack of a sufficiently large number of observations,
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e.g. , FMSO only has eight quarters of stock item demand
history, 15 months of requisition processing time information,
etc. The development of a practical approach of pooling time
series and cross-sectional (inter-activity) would allow FMSO
to increase the sample size in most of their quantitative
analyses to obtain more significant results. An approach
similar to that in Woodbury's thesis [23] might prove to be
useful.
C. DEMAND FORECASTING
Definite seasonal patterns in aggregate demand exist,
e.g., NAVSUP sales in June are always the highest each year
whereas sales in July are almost always the lowest; December
sales are down, but January sales are up. Current NAVSUP
demand forecasting techniques cannot handle this kind of
autoregressive process. The development of other methods of
forecasting demand and sales is required.
The development of valid program relationships between
demands for parts and fleet operations should be pursued.
An extension of the Lippert and Lee thesis [13] to further
identify the proper variates affecting demands could lead
to better demand forecasting techniques.
D. STOCKING CRITERIA
NAVSUP is participating on a DOD committee which is
working on the development of stocking criteria for provi-
sioning. NAVSUP does not now have a usable retail stocking
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criterion for stock points. A primitive heuristic criterion
(stock if four demands occur in 6 months) is currently in





THE CORRELATION BETWEEN FORCE LVELS AND NAVSUP WORKLOAD
To show that a significant correlation exists between
the three force level indicators and the three workload
indicators, an abstract composite index for each set was
obtained by using manpower utilized as a common denominator,
The following procedure is as described in Reference 7.







F = Force Level
M = Man-month
n = Given year
= Base year
i = Force Level Indicator
From the illustrative data below X is computed to be
X = 1.079.
V (0) (n)
Force Level Indicators FY 1 FY 2
(1) Ships: # of support items
(000)











(3) Personnel: 500,000 450,000 p| = |Moo = 0i 900
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Man-Month Weights for Force Levels Index
in *r» in
(1) Ships: Mln = 4,538 0.597
(2) Aircraft: M2n = 1,808 0.238
(3) Personnel: M3n = 1,254 0.165
TOTAL 7,600 = 2 M i n
i
The man-month weights are derived by assigning (using
cognizance symbols) the manpower utilized by supply
activities to either ships, aircraft, or personnel. For
instance, hours expended on cognizance 2R items (Aeronautical
Material) was assigned to "Aircraft Support Items Force
Level." To provide the weighting factors for the workload
indicators, the manpower utilization is further identified
to either Line Items Received and Issued, Measurement Tons
Received and Issued, or Measurement Tons In Store.
Illustrative data is shown below.
Man-Months Associated With Force Level and Workload Indicators
Line Items Measurement Tons Measurement Tons FORCE







Aircraft 308 500 1000 1808
Personnel 154 600 500 1254
















From the illustrative data below, Y is computed to be
Y = 1.072.
Workload Indicators
(1) L/I Rec & ISS (000)
(2) M/T Rec & ISS (000)
(3) M/T In Store (000)
(0) (n)




















Man Month Weights for Workload Index
(1) L/I Rec & Iss
(2) M/T Rec & Iss





M = 21002n 0.276
M 3n
= 3500 0.461
7600 = S Mln
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Having the two variables, the independent, or force
level composite index (X) and the dependent, or workload
composite index (Y) for fiscal years 1955 through 196l, the
data were related using a simple linear regression model.
The resultant coefficient of correlation (R) was O.8717 and
p
the coefficient of determination (R ) indicated that approxi-
mately 75$ of the variance in the workload composite index
for supply operations of NAVSUP is attributable to variation
in the force level composite index based on the forces this
workload supports. The linear equation Y = .0.237 + 0.7^4 X







1. Definition of variables and constants.
F - Force Level Units (FLU) (e.g. aircraft, ships, etc.)
R - Mean Supply Response Time (MSRT)
M - Supply system man-months
S - Months of stock
k-, - Mean Time Between Failures (MTBF)
k? - Mean Time to Repair (MTTR)
c
1
-- Cost of a FLU
c ?
- Cost of operating a FLU per month
c, - Cost of a man-month
C|, - Cost of a month of stock
a,$,y - Regression coefficients
AP - Marginal physical product
AC - Marginal cost
I - Nominal interest rate
L - Life expectancy of a FLU (months)
A - Operational availability
N - Operational Force Level Units
2. Compute marginal physical products.
Define
:
N = total number of operating Force Level Units





N " PAo "
F ( k, TT-Tr )1--2-" k 1 + k2 + R
First partial derivatives.
(1)













3. Compute marginal costs.
C^ = (flyaway cost + operating cost) x FLU
CF







= W = °1 + °2 e
C- = (cost of a man-month x man-months) +
(cost of a month of stock x months of stock)
= c^M + C4S
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Using total partial derivative.
3CD 3C„ 3M 3C„ 3S
Ap - « =
_J1 + £1





~ c 3 ~R c 4 -r
(5) Assume R = ye
then M = my - In R - 3S
a In y - In R - aMand S = ! g






Substituting into equation (4)
^
D; 3R aR 3R R a 3 ;
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~W " k l " k2
Substituting equation (10) into equation (9)
k-F
k, + k ? +
~ k - k p
—
*f — = Right Hand Side
. , . -ILs , . -aM-RSs






N 3c + ac
4
Solving for M.





M = ln[*^ + BS
-a
or
ln[(c, + c 9e~
IL )NaBy] - ln[k- (Be, + acj ] - BS
a
To compute the dollar value requirement
$M = cJVI
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